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ABSTRACT
This thesis undertakes an analysis of the current tension between patents law obligations under TRIPS 
Agreement  and human rights,  specifically  in  the  context  of  how the TRIPS Agreement  influences 
health innovation and access to medicines in Brazil. Following a general overview of the interaction 
between human rights  and patent  law within  the WTO, the  central  aim is  based on the  empirical 
analysis of two Brazilian case studies: “Pharmaceutical Patents on Access to Medicines” and “ONSA 
Network’s Genoma Program”. The purpose of the first case study is to describe how Brazilian access to 
medicine was impacted by the incorporation of TRIPS Agreement provisions into Brazil’s legislation, 
including how the country is making use of some TRIPS flexibilities relevant to the subject matter, as 
well as assess the consequences of this impact. The second case study is an example of a reaction to the 
legal framework that followed the TRIPS Agreement and consists of a system of voluntary licensing, 
based on a collaborative and open approach to innovation,  with the outcome of making the research 
data  available free from patent's limitation. Considering that Brazil's intellectual property regime is 
strongly shaped by global regulation,  particularly the terms of the TRIPS Agreement - as the case 
studies illustrate - the final purpose is to assess how to better accommodate human rights within the 
WTO, in order to provide Brazil (and other WTO members) with a more secure basis to pursue the 
balance between patents and human rights.
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ABREVIATIONS
ARV: anti-retroviral
Doha Declaration: Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
DS: dispute settlement
DSU: dispute settlement understanding
EC: European Communities
FTAs: free trade agreements 
ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
LCDs: least developed countries 
R&D: research and development 
TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UNDH: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN High Commissioner: United Nations’ High Commissioner on Human Rights
WHO: World Health Organization
WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO: World Trade Organization 
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1 INTRODUCTION
Current  industrial  property law is  shaped by the  Paris  Convention  for  the Protection  of  Industrial 
Property (1883)1 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994)2 
(TRIPS  Agreement)  which  established  minimum  standards  of  protection  that  each  World  Trade 
Organization  (WTO)  member  has  to  give  to  intellectual  property,  thus  limiting  flexible  national 
approaches. Since then, the development of science, especially in the fields of plant variety, genes and 
traditional  knowledge,  has  been  challenging  the  patentability  criteria.  In  addition,  an  increasing 
attention to human rights3 has been challenging States to comply with both patents law obligations 
under  TRIPS  Agreement  and  their  responsibility  to  implement  human  rights  under  international 
covenants, such as the  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
ratified by Brazil in 1992.  
Regarding access to medicines, since the 1950s a right to health (in reality a right to health care – with  
access to medicine being an essential component of it) has been developing in public international law 
and coming into conflict with the TRIPS Agreement4.  Right to health is especially provided for in 
article 25 of the  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)5 (1948) and in article 12 of the 
ICESCR6 (1966),  as well as in regional human rights instruments and many national constitutions7. 
1 Dated  of  March 20, 1883,  followed  by  several  revisions  and  amendments,  the  last  one  dates 
September 28, 1979. Available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html.
2 GROSHEIDE, Williem. General Introduction, in Intellectual Property and Human Rights: a Paradox, edited 
by Willem Grosheide, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited (EE), 2010, p. 4.
3 DREYFUSS,  Rochelle  C.  Patents  and  Human  Rights:  Where  is  the  Paradox? Molengrafica  Series, 
Forthcoming; New York University, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-38; New York University 
Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 06-29. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=929498.
4 HESTERMEYER, Holger. Human Rights and the WTO. Oxford, 2007, introduction xxxiv.
5 Which says: “(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of  
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services,  
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack  
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. (2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care  
and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection”.
6 Article 12 of the ICESCR states:  
“1. The States Parties to the present  Covenant recognize the right  of  everyone to the enjoyment of  the  
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this  
right shall include those necessary for:
(a)  The  provision  for  the  reduction  of  the  stillbirth-rate  and  of  infant  mortality  and  for  the  healthy  
development of the child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event  
of sickness.”
7 By 2009, 135 countries, including Brazil, had incorporated aspects of the right to health in their national  
constitutions. WHO, WIPO, WTO. Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation. Intersections  
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Accessibility of medicine is therefore a central element of the international human rights system8 and 
one of the interests of society that have to be brought into balance with the TRIPS Agreement9.
The TRIPS Agreement acknowledges the necessity to accommodate right to health in article 8.1, which 
states that:
“[m]embers  may,  in  formulating  or  amending  their  laws  and  regulations,  adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest  in  sectors  of  vital  importance  to  their  socio-economic  and  technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement”. 
In addition, the TRIPS Agreement incorporated the so-called "flexibilities" in order to permit countries 
to use TRIPS-compatible norms in a manner that enables them to pursue their own public policies10. In 
practice, however, there is a lot of uncertainty and discussion about how to accommodate human rights 
within the WTO, as well as a prevailing influence of economic and private interests, making human 
rights a secondary concern within the WTO system11. 
Due to the TRIPS Agreement, access to medicine has been affected in some WTO member countries.  
The case of “Pharmaceutical Patents on Access to Medicines”, analysed below, demonstrates that, since 
Brazilian legislators adopted measures to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, there has been a threat to  
the current health care system in Brazil12. Aggravating the situation further, Brazilian legislators also 
adopted measures not required by TRIPS, presumably due to international pressure and influence of 
private  interests,  such  as  early  implementation,  a  patent  pipeline  and  the  prohibition  of  parallel 
importation. On the other hand,  counter-measures to mitigate the effects of patent law on access to 
medicines have been adopted, namely compulsory licenses, the prior consent mechanism, the Bolar 
exception and the Popular Drugstore Program. This case study illustrates that it is far from easy to 
strike the balance between patent law obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and right to health. 
Another  reaction  to  the  patent  system that  followed the  adoption  of  the  TRIPS Agreement  is  the 
emergence of  alternative models which can annul or mitigate the restrictions imposed by patent law, 
between  public  health,  intellectual  property  and  trade. 2013.  Available  at 
www.who.int/phi/promoting_access_medical_innovation/en/, p. 40.
8 WHO,  WIPO,  WTO,  ibidem,  p.  40.  “Although  no  international  tribunal  or  adjudicative  body  has  yet  
enforced such right-to-health measures against a state, widespread commitment to health as a universal  
right  does  exist”.  CROOK, Jamie.  Balancing Intellectual  Property  Protection with the  Human Right  to  
Health. Berkeley Journal of International Law, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2005, p. 537.
9 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 51.
10 According  to  WIPO  Secretariat.  Available  at  http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html. 
11 DREYFUSS, ibidem.
12 ROSINA, Monica Steffen Guise, WANG, Thana Cristina de and CAMPOS, Daniel.  Access to Medicines:  
Pharmaceutical Patents and the Right to Health. in Access to knowledge in Brazil. Lea Shaver (editor), 2nd 
edition, Bloomsbury Academia, 2010, pp. 197-198.
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including open source13 and patent pools models14. But they require the creation of a legal structure and 
the  agreement  of  possible  patent  holders,  so  they  can  only  work  in  an  organized  and  structured 
environment and under specific circumstances. The second case studied herein, the “ONSA Network’s 
Genoma Program”, represents one of these alternative models, an  open business model consisting of 
voluntary licensing in order to make research data available free from patent law restrictions. 
The empirical analysis of the two Brazilian case studies, “ONSA Network’s Genoma Program” and 
“Pharmaceutical Patents on Access to Medicines”, thus raises the question of where the patents legal 
regime is tending towards and incite scholars to look for solutions to better accommodate human rights 
within the WTO system. 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION
The  central  aim  of  this  work  is  an  empirical  analysis  of  how  the  incorporation  of  the  TRIPS 
Agreement's  provisions  into  Brazilian  law  -  including  the  way  Brazil  is  making  use  of  TRIPS 
flexibilities  and  alternative  models  -  impacted  medical  innovation  and  access  to  medicines  in  the 
country, and an assessment of the consequences.
1.2 METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE 
The study is  primarily  based  on the  relevant  doctrine,  followed  by WTO case  laws,  international 
treaties and Brazilian legislation on the subject matter. Methodology and structure will be as follows: 
1. FIRST PART: an axiological approach consisting of an analysis of  the relation between human 
rights and the TRIPS Agreements, followed by a general descriptive approach of how the WTO 
applies non-WTO law when interpreting its rules or solving conflict of law between WTO and 
non-WTO law.
2. SECOND PART:  empirical  analysis  of two Brazilian case studies,  “Pharmaceutical Patents on 
Access to Medicines” and “ONSA Network’s Genoma Program”. The purpose of this empirical 
analysis is to assess the tension between patent law obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and 
human rights in practice, as well as the consequences for the Brazilian health care system. 
3. The last part consists of a first step solution to better accommodate human rights within the 
WTO. 
13 Further explained in sub-chapter 2.2. 
14 “A patent pool is an agreement between at least two patent owners to group their patent rights relating to a  
specific technology and to license the rights to use these patents to each other and to third parties, subject to  
certain conditions such as the payment of royalties”. WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 119.
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2 FIRST PART. TRIPS AGREEMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS. 
FUNDAMENTALS
2.1 TRIPS AND ITS UTILITARIAN APPROACH
First of all it is important to note that due to its limited scope, this study will not discuss the history of 
patent law nor will engage in natural law property arguments to justify patents.15 This paper assumes 
that today patents are almost universally justified by utilitarian ideas rather than natural law property 
arguments.16 An  utilitarianism approach means, according to HELFER and AUSTIN, to employ the 
analytical tools of utilitarianism and welfare economics to evaluate the trade-offs between incentives 
and access, and the consequences for the individuals and firms that create, own, and consume intellec-
tual property products.17
In fact, legislators have always tried to tailor patent laws to the goal of inducing the introduction of new 
knowledge within their territory with minimal disadvantages to society.18 In this sense, article 7 of the 
TRIPS Agreement puts the objectives of the Agreement as follows: 
“the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological know-
ledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of 
rights and obligations”. 
According to HESTERMEYER19, besides promoting a utilitarian public policy rationale for granting 
patents, namely promoting technological innovation and transfer and dissemination of technology, the 
above mentioned provision expresses the idea that the TRIPS Agreement seeks to strike a balance 
between the rights of the patent holder and the interests of the users. However, according to DREY-
FUSS20, HESTERMEYER21, as well as the UN High Commissioner22, economic and practical consider-
ations prevail in the current patent system and human rights are not a main concern within the WTO 
system. 
15 Although the natural law argument of the fairness of ownership in one's own inventions has certainly exerted 
an influence on the development of patent law. HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 18. 
16 HESTERMEYER sums up  on  page  29  that  “[t]oo  many  aspects  of  patent  law contradict  natural  law  
notions: the fact that inventors have to go through an administrative procedure to obtain a patent rather  
than having an automatic right in their invention, the loss of all rights of parallel inventors if someone else  
obtains a patent, and, most prominently, its time-limited character”. HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 18.
17 HELFER, Laurence R. and AUSTIN, Graeme W.  Human Rights and Intellectual Property Mapping the  
Global Interface, Cambridge, 2011, p. 504.
18 HESTERMEYER, ibidem,  p. 21.
19 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 51.
20 DREYFUSS, ibidem, p. 19.
21 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 298.
22 HIGH COMMISSIONER on Human Rights. Report  on the  impact  of  the  Agreement  on Trade-Related  
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights of 27 June 2001, para. 22.
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Accordingly, the United Nation’s High Commissioner on Human Rights, in the report on the impact of 
the TRIPS Agreement on human rights of 27 June 2001, highlighted that, if a human rights approach 
were a main concern, the TRIPS Agreement would explicitly place the promotion and protection of hu-
man rights, in particular those in the ICESCR, at the heart of the objectives of intellectual property 
protection, but, instead,  the TRIPS Agreement expressed them in terms of exceptions. It is worth quot-
ing what was said in the report: 
 “[t]he various links with the subject matter of human rights - the promotion of pub-
lic health, nutrition, environment and development - are generally expressed in terms 
of exceptions to the rule rather than the guiding principles themselves and are made 
subject to the provisions of the Agreement. A human rights approach, on the other 
hand, would explicitly place the promotion and protection of human rights, in partic-
ular those in ICESCR, at the heart of the objectives of intellectual property protec-
tion, rather than only as permitted exceptions that are subordinated to the other pro-
visions of the Agreement.”23 
Although  human  rights  are  not  a  main  concern  within  the  TRIPS  Agreement,   DREYFUSS24, 
HESTERMEYER25 and the UN High Commissioner26 concluded that patent law obligations  and hu-
man rights are not fundamentally opposed. The conflict between human rights and patent law is in sub-
stance a conflict of norms and, as such, it is up to policy makers to align the patent system with other 
social interests, including but not limited to ones that are deemed fundamental27. In other words, the 
balance between general public interests in accessing new knowledge and the interests of authors and 
inventors depends on how intellectual property is actually implemented.  
A lot of factors may, in practice, influence the implementation of intellectual property, including how 
the WTO considers non-WTO law when interpreting its rules or solving a conflict of patent law with 
another cluster of law. This is analysed in the sub-chapter below. 
2.2 APPLICABLE LAW AND AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO
This section works on the applicable law within the WTO system and paves the way for the second part 
(Chapter 2), which engages in a descriptive approach of how the TRIPS provisions were incorporated 
into Brazilian law, including how some flexibilities relevant to the subject matter were interpreted by 
the WTO and applied in Brazil.  
23 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem,  para. 22.
24 DREYFUSS, ibidem, p. 19.
25 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 298.
26 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 22.
27 “An utilitarian perspective allows policy makers to use the ample arsenal of available tools to make law  
responsive to changes in innovation and to align the system with other social interests, including but not  
limited to ones that are deemed fundamental.” DREYFUSS, ibidem, p. 19.
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2.2.1 FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
According to HESTERMEYER28, the conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicine is 
in substance a conflict between world trade and human rights. However, the national approach to solve 
a conflict of laws, which is usually based on the concept of hierarchy, including erga omnes norms and 
jus cogens, does not work in the same way at the international level due to the fragmentation of interna-
tional law, explained below.  
In national systems there is usually one adjudicatory body that is empowered to solve conflicts of law. 
At the international level, different regimes are endowed with different adjudication and enforcement 
bodies, often with limited jurisdiction and empowered to apply only a limited set of norms or give pref-
erence to a certain set of norms. These adjudicatory systems can come into conflict by applying the 
same law differently or by applying different laws and imposing contradictory rulings on a state. 
Due to this fragmentation of international law, the conflict between human rights and patent law may 
have different outcomes at the national and international level. Human rights law is regarded as higher 
in what could be called the ‘moral appeal’ than trade or patent law and, in national legislations, it seems 
natural to grant a superior constitutional function to human rights norms29 30. However, in international 
law, a true hierarchy is prevented both by the fact that the concept of jus cogens still awaits its first real 
test and by the existence of sectorally organized regimes.31 
Different from the system of most national laws, the WTO is only empowered to apply one of the con-
flicting norms32. Indeed it does not have to deal with the rules for regime conflict under general interna-
tional law - it will merely apply the rule it is empowered to apply – and the decision of the tribunal can  
thus differ from the resolution of the regime conflict that general international law would have im-
posed33.
The existence of sectorally organized regimes at the international level leads to a factual hierarchy of  
regimes, which is independent of the normative hierarchy. According to HESTERMEYER34, for prac-
tical reasons, states will tend to abide by the rules of the regime with the strongest enforcement mech-
anism even if the rules enforced by this mechanism are inferior to the conflicting rules under both gen-
eral international law and national law. 
28 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 298.
29 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 40. 
30 By  2009,  135  countries  had  incorporated  aspects  of  the  right  to  health  in  their  national  constitutions.  
HESTERMEYER, ibidem, pp. 298-299. 
31 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 298.
32 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p 208.
33 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p 208.
34 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 298.
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In fact, whereas the human rights regime has a rather weak enforcement mechanism, the WTO regime 
is second to none35 in the factual hierarchy due to its effective enforcement mechanism36. Therefore, in 
the international arena, where human rights law is in conflict with WTO law, states will tend to abide 
by the rulings of WTO dispute settlement organs due to the superior factual hierarchy of the WTO re-
gime. 
Considering this practical situation, the decisive question is to what extent the WTO dispute settlement 
body can apply the human rights norm of access to medicine37. In other words, the vital question that 
needs to be addressed is the question of the use of non-WTO law within the WTO system. Scholars 
have asked this question with respect to several legal regimes, especially the applicability of environ-
mental law or human rights law within the WTO system.
2.2.2 APPLICABLE LAW AND AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION
Once a WTO panel has accepted a case, it has to decide which law it is empowered to apply. According 
to HESTERMEYER the treaty setting up a tribunal usually determines the rules the tribunal has to ap-
ply. Accordingly, article 7.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) limits the applicable law 
in WTO dispute settlement to the covered agreements, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise.  
The WTO adjudicating bodies will also apply non-WTO treaties as applicable law where the covered 
agreements explicitly refer to them, such as in article XV:9(a) of the GATT.38
Scholars have discussed different approaches as to how human rights law can be applied in a WTO dis-
pute settlement: (i) not at all (conceiving the WTO as a self-contained regime), (ii) merely for the inter-
pretation of WTO covered agreements, to the extent that there is no conflict with WTO rules, (iii) along 
with WTO rules and general international law rules on conflict of norms, or (iv) on a par with WTO 
rules so that human rights law can be enforced by WTO dispute settlement proceedings.39
2.2.3 JURISPRUDENCE ON NON-WTO LAW IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The prevailing understanding within the WTO dispute settlement body is that non-WTO treaties (in-
cluding, in the case of access to medicine, the ICESCR and general international law) can all be taken 
into account merely in the interpretation of the covered agreements40. WTO jurisprudence also under-
stands that although non-WTO treaties can be used as an aid for interpreting the covered agreements, 
35 The TRIPS Agreement sets out  the only comprehensive multilateral  framework within which to enforce 
intellectual property rights. WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 70.
36 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, pp. 298-299.
37 HESTERMEYER, ibidem.
38 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 225.
39 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 299. According to the author, the use of the ICESCR and general international 
law as an interpretative aid resembles the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in light of its object and 
purpose. However, it is more specific than the latter and connects the interpretation to efforts undertaken in 
fora such as the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
40 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 225 and 299. 
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they are not part of the applicable law41 and can not prevail when they contradict a WTO covered 
agreement. 
Case law clearly confirms this understanding. In the case EC- Poultry42, the European Communities 
and Brazil had come to sign Agreed Minutes (the ‘Oilseeds Agreement’) in negotiations under article 
XXVIII of the GATT before the entry into force of the WTO Agreements. The Appellate Body dis-
cussed the relationship between the European tariff schedule and the Oilseeds Agreement and held that 
only the schedule is part of the covered agreements, not the Oilseeds Agreement. Consequently it is the 
schedule that forms the legal basis to guide the WTO. The Appellate Body considered that the Oilseeds 
Agreement could merely be used to interpret the schedule under article 32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties43. Quoting the relevant parts of the decision:
“(…) the Oilseeds Agreement is not a "covered agreement" within the meaning of 
Articles 1 and 2 of the DSU. Nor is the Oilseeds Agreement part of the multilateral  
obligations  accepted  by  Brazil  and  the  European  Communities  pursuant  to  the 
WTO Agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1995. The Oilseeds Agree-
ment is not cited in any Annex to the WTO Agreement. (…) 
80. Furthermore, the Oilseeds Agreement does not constitute part of the "decisions, 
procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to 
GATT 1947" by which the WTO "shall  be guided" under Article XVI:1 of the 
WTO Agreement. These "decisions, procedures and customary practices" include 
only those taken or followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 
acting jointly.
81. It is Schedule LXXX, rather than the Oilseeds Agreement, which contains the 
relevant  obligations  of  the  European  Communities  under  the  WTO Agreement. 
Therefore, it is Schedule LXXX, rather than the Oilseeds Agreement, which forms 
the legal basis for this dispute and which must be interpreted in accordance with 
"customary rules of interpretation of public international law" under Article 3.2 of 
the DSU. (...)
83. We recognize that the Oilseeds Agreement was negotiated within the frame-
work of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1947 with the authorization of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES and that both parties agree that the substance of the Oil-
seeds Agreement was the basis for the 15,500 tonne tariff-rate quota for frozen 
poultry meat that became a concession of the European Communities in the Ur-
uguay Round set forth in Schedule LXXX. Therefore, in our view, the Oilseeds 
Agreement  may  serve  as  a  supplementary  means  of  interpretation  of  Schedule 
LXXX pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, as it is part of the historic-
al background of the concessions of the European Communities for frozen poultry 
meat.”44
41 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, pp. 298-299.
42 Dispute Settlement DS69. European Communities — Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry 
Products. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds69_e.htm.
43 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 225.
44 Dispute Settlement DS69. ibidem, pp. 29-31.
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According to HESTERMEYER, the outcome of the case EC- Poultry would be different if the WTO 
dispute settlement allowed a non-WTO law to override WTO law45. 
Moreover, in the panel EC – Biotech46,  the WTO dispute settlement body concluded that  non-WTO 
treaties may be relied on in the interpretation of WTO Agreements even where one or more disputing 
parties are not parties to them47. In fact, not all states are part of both WTO and human rights coven-
ants. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the ICESCR have been rat-
ified by approximately 85 per cent of the WTO members48; notably, the United States has not ratified 
the ICESCR. In the panel EC – Biotech, after having extensively discussed the relevance of non-WTO 
law to the interpretation of the WTO Agreements and relying both on article 31(3)(c) and 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention, the panel stated that the fact that not the whole WTO membership has signed hu-
man rights covenants “does not necessarily mean that a convention cannot shed light on the meaning  
and scope of a treaty term to be interpreted”49.
2.2.4 JURISPRUDENCE ON GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT
WTO adjudicating bodies have made more frequent use of general international law than of non-WTO 
treaty law50.  They have generally used rules of general international law51 in the interpretation of the 
covered agreements or to confirm an interpretation of the covered agreements, much like they use non-
WTO treaty law. 
General international law plays a more important roll when it comes to procedure, on which the DSU is 
silent. HESTERMEYER pointed out several cases regarding the subject matter, as in EC—Bananas52, 
in which the Appellate Body first held that a requirement of legal interest was not contained in the DSU 
to then state that such a requirement could also not be deduced from general international law. In EC—
Hormones53, the Appellate Body concluded that precautionary principle does not, by itself, and without 
a clear textual directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of applying customary international 
law principles of treaty interpretation in reading the provisions of the Agreement on the Application of 
45 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 226.
46 Dispute Settlement DS291. European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm.
47 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, pp. 298-299.   
48 HESTERMEYER, ibidem pp. 298-299.
49 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, pp. 224-225.
50 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 226.
51 The  Appellate  Body  has  generally  taken  article  3.2  of  the  DSU,  which  prescribes  the  application  of  
customary rules of interpretation of public international law,  to refer to articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention. It also applied other rules of interpretation, such as article 28 of the Vienna Convention, the 
principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat), that of in dubio mitius , or the principle of good 
faith. HESTERMEYER, ibidem, pp. 226-227.
52 Dispute Settlement DS27. European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm..
53 Dispute  Settlement  DS26.  European  Communities  —  Measures  Concerning  Meat  and  Meat  Products  
(Hormones). Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm.
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Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement)54. The best-known example is the Appellate 
Body's holding on the question of burden of proof in US—Shirts and Blouses55. In this case, the Appel-
late Body determined that “the burden of proof rests upon the party (…) who asserts the affirmative of  
a particular claim or defence”. The justification it cites for this holding is that this rule is generally ac-
cepted both by international tribunals and national courts56. 
HESTERMEYER argues that in US—Shirts and Blouses, and in many other cases, the Appellate Body 
arguably had no choice but to apply general international law as it intrinsically had to rule on procedur-
al questions involved and the DSU was silent on the issue. The same cannot be said of matters of sub-
stance, namely claims under the WTO Agreements, on which WTO law is not silent57. 
2.2.5 ACCESS TO MEDICINE AS JUS COGENS WITHIN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
As explained, according to the prevailing understanding within the WTO dispute settlement body, hu-
man rights are only used in the interpretation of the covered agreements, they are not part of the applic-
able law nor can prevail over a WTO covered agreement. As a consequence, a WTO member cannot 
rely on human rights in the defence against a claim of violation of WTO law absent a basis for this de-
fence in the covered agreements. The situation is different, however, where the human right has at-
tained the status of jus cogens. 
HESTERMEYER sums up the discussion: 
“jus cogens “cannot be contracted out of — indeed, under the Vienna Convention 
they void any agreement that attempts to do so. This hierarchically superior posi-
tion would allow a defence against the claim of a violation of WTO law even with-
in WTO dispute settlement. What remains to be discussed is whether the right to 
access to medicine has attained such a position. It is hard not to feel sympathy with 
the proposition that it has: does access to medicine not have to prevail over eco-
nomic interests, particularly where the life of millions is at stake? But the question 
oversimplifies the issues involved. The doctrine of jus cogens is a relatively young 
one and is still awaiting its first serious test case. Commonly, only a mere handful 
of principles are cited as examples of the doctrine, such as the prohibition of geno-
cide.  All  of these are widely accepted and of comparatively long standing. The 
same cannot be said for access to medicine: the reluctance of the United States to 
recognize economic, social,  and cultural rights is indicative of the problems the 
right faces and while this reluctance might have subsided sufficiently in the area of 
access to medicine in health emergencies to recognize such a right as customary, it 
is not sufficient to raise it immediately to the status of jus cogens.”58
*
54 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 227.
55 Dispute Settlement DS33. United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses 
from India. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds33_e.htm.
56 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, pp. 227-228.
57 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 228.
58 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 229.
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To sum up, according to WTO jurisprudence, non-WTO treaties and general international law can be 
used merely as an aid for interpreting the covered agreements, as long as they do not contradict WTO 
agreements. The Appellate Body goes a step further and applies general international law only to rule 
on procedural questions on which the DSU is silent, but not in case of matters of substance. Because of  
these findings and because access to medicine is not undoubtedly understood as a jus cogens, a WTO 
member cannot rely on the right to access to medicine as a defence against a claim of violation of WTO 
law absent a basis for the defence in the covered agreements59. 
59 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 300.
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3 SECOND PART: IMPLEMENTATION OF PATENT LAW. CASE 
STUDIES
This second part concerns the central claim of this work - to describe how Brazilian access to medi-
cine was impacted by the WTO patent system, as well as assess the consequences of this influence.
This second part engages in the empirical analysis of two Brazilian case studies: “Pharmaceutical 
Patents on Access to Medicines” and “ONSA Network’s Genoma Program”.  The purpose of the 
first case study is to analyse how the Brazilian access to medicine was affected by the TRIPS 
Agreement, including how Brazil is making use of some TRIPS flexibilities relevant to the subject 
matter. The second case study consists of a trend towards voluntary licensing, based on a collabor-
ative and open approach to innovation and represents a reaction to the system that followed the 
TRIPS Agreement, with the outcome of making research data available for public use and free from 
patent law restrictions. 
These cases were selected because they deal with conflicts between human rights and industrial 
property from different perspectives. The analysis of pharmaceutical patents is primarily connect to 
the law-making decision sphere, while the ONSA Network concerns the creation of  alternative 
models which co-exist with the legal framework, limiting its effect. Moreover, while the analysis of 
the ONSA Network focuses on innovation, the analysis of pharmaceutical patents focuses on distri-
bution. Both cases, thus, provide a wide and embracing overview of the sometimes-difficult inter-
action between patent law and human rights.  
3.1 PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN BRAZIL. 
ACCESSIBILITY PERSPECTIVE
Before the TRIPS Agreement came into force, countries were largely at liberty to decide whether they 
wanted to grant patents and how to construct their patent system, and many countries had chosen not to 
grant patents for pharmaceutical products60. With the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement as part of the 
WTO Agreements  in  1994 and  the  expiration  of  most  of  its  transitional  periods,  all  major  WTO 
members will have to adopt patent laws that provide for the grant of pharmaceutical patents61, as article 
27(1) of the TRIPS agreement establishes that patents must be available for all fields of technology, 
which includes patents for pharmaceutical products62. The new patenting situation allows inventors to 
60 In 1988, at an early stage in the TRIPS negotiations, a WIPO report cited 49 countries that either did not grant patent  
protection for pharmaceutical products at all or only provided a limited form of protection.  WHO, WIPO, WTO, 
ibidem, p. 56.
61 This transition period has been extended twice for all least developed countries (LDCs) members in response 
to a specific request by the LDC Group. In its decision of 29 November 2005, the TRIPS Council extended 
the period until 1 July 2013, and on 11 June 2013, it extended this further until 1 July 2021 — or when a  
particular  country  ceases  to  be  in  the  least  developed  category  if  that  happens  before  2021.  WTO. 
Responding  to  least  developed  countries’  special  needs  in  intellectual  property. Available  at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ldc_e.htm.
62 DUNCAN, Matthews.  Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and the Right to Health.  in Intellectual 
16
obtain patents for a newly invented pharmaceutical product in most countries that can produce the 
product and hence prevent competitors from making generic versions of the drug for the duration of the 
patent term63. 
As mentioned above, article 27(1) of the TRIPS agreement states that patents must be available for all  
fields of technology, including patents for pharmaceutical products64. However, with regard to the right 
to health, one must also take into account article 25 of the UDHR, which says that “[e]veryone has the  
right  to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of  himself  and of  his  family,  
including  food,  clothing,  housing  and  medical  care  (…)”  and  article  12  of  the  ICESCR,  which 
recognizes “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and  
mental health”, further strengthened by the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress contained in 
article 15 (1) (b) of the ICESCR. The case of pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines in Brazil 
illustrates the tension between these provisions.
In order to situate the context of this analysis, a brief historical introduction is necessary. SHAVER 65 
sums up the historical context. Prior to 1996, pharmaceuticals were not eligible for patent  protection in 
Brazil. This allowed the government to rely on cheaper domestic copies to meet its public health needs. 
The manufacture of inexpensive generic medicines facilitated the creation of a national health system 
in which every individual was promised free access to comprehensive health care, including treatment, 
access to facilities and free medicines. Under article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, however, Brazil was 
required to start granting patents for medicines66. However, since reforming its intellectual property law 
to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, Brazil has seen its public spending on medicines dramatically 
increase67.  Recognizing this reality, the nation’s highest court has already shown signs of limiting the 
scope of the constitutional right of access to medicines. The high cost of patented drugs is thus a key 
matter to be addressed if the right to health is to be preserved68.
One of the main reasons for such an increase in drug expenditure was the introduction of patent protec-
tion for pharmaceutical products in the country69. ROSINA, WANG and CAMPOS cite a study that 
found that, while total health expenditure went up 9.6% between 2002 and 2006, drug expenditure 
alone increased by 123.9% over the same period70, due to patent protection.
Aggravating the situation further, the legislature approved patentability for pharmaceutical products 
almost  immediately,  rather  than  pursuing  a  more  gradual  implementation  allowed  by  the  TRIPS 
Agreement, and also implemented two measures not required by TRIPS that further increased the price 
Property Rights and Human Rights: A Paradox, W. Grosheide, ed., November 2009.
63 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, introduction xxxiv.
64 DUNCAN, Matthews.  Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and the Right to Health.  in Intellectual 
Property Rights and Human Rights: A Paradox, W. Grosheide, ed., November 2009.
65 SHAVER,  Lea.  Introduction.  in  Access  to  knowledge  in  Brazil.  Lea  Shaver  (editor),  2nd  edition, 
Bloomsbury Academia, 2010, p. 16.
66 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 182.
67 SHAVER, ibidem, p. 16.
68 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 197.
69 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 182.
70 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 181.
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of medicines: the granting of pipeline patents and the prohibition of parallel imports71. These measures 
are described below.
3.1.1 MEASURES IN OPPOSITION TO ACCESS TO MEDICINES
3.1.1.1 EARLY IMPLEMENTATION
As a developing country, Brazil could have used the transitional period established by article 65 of the 
TRIPS Agreement to delay implementing its provisions until 2000. However, rather than pursuing a 
more gradual implementation, the legislature approved patentability for pharmaceutical products earlier 
in  1996  (through  the  Brazilian  Intellectual  Property  Law,  federal  law  No.  9.279/96)72 as  it  was 
prompted  by  industry  pressure,  as  patent  protection  allows  industries  to  set  monopoly  prices  and 
capture royalty revenues from their innovations73. 
HESTERMEZER described the pressure exerted by Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, which 
led to Brazil changing its patent law in detriment of access to medicines, as a consequence of a threat  
made by the US to Brazil in 1988 of imposing a 100 per cent ‘retaliatory’ tariff on Brazilian imports 
worth $39m: 
“after a section 301 investigation initiated by pharmaceutical manufacturers because 
of Brazil's refusal to grant patent protection to pharmaceuticals. Brazil regarded the 
tariffs as a breach of US obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), as Brazil had no obligation under international law to grant such pat-
ent protection [at that time]. A GATT Panel was established in 1989, but the proceed-
ings were suspended when Brazil gave in to the pressure announcing that it  would 
change its patent law. The US withdrew its retaliatory sanctions. Section 301 has re-
mained a divisive issue and its WTO-consistency was challenged before a WTO Pan-
el in 1999”74 75. 
3.1.1.2 PATENT PIPELINE
As explained,  until 1996 Brazilian law did not recognize patents on pharmaceuticals. Only with the 
TRIPS Agreement and the enactment of law 9.279/96 did such substances become eligible for patent 
protection in Brazil, in an early incorporation of the terms of the TRIPS agreements, considering that 
the country could have opened this possibility later in 2000. Moreover, articles 230 and 231 of the 
mentioned law went even further and included a pipeline protection, which was not required by TRIPS. 
This  provision opened the possibility of patenting compounds that were not patentable, provided that 
certain requirements were fulfilled: (i) the compound was not yet marketed in Brazil, (ii) no serious 
71 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem.
72 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 182.
73 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, pp. 197-198.
74 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 40. 
75 The WTO concluded that those aspects of Sections 301-310 of the US Trade Act brought the dispute are not 
inconsistent  with  US  obligations  under  the  WTO.  WT/DS152/R  of  22  December  1999.  Available  at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanels/us-section301(panel).pdf.
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efforts were made by third parties to exploit the patent subject matter in Brazil until the time of the  
request, (iii) that a patent had already been granted in at least one other country, and (iv) the patent  
application had to be filed by within 1 year from the publication of the law 9.279/96. Only a formal 
examination regarding those criteria was necessary, the national examination requirements regarding 
novelty, industrial applicability, inventive step were not to be considered76.
It made possible to apply for patent protection for compounds  that would otherwise not have been 
patentable – either before or after the new patent law. Before the new law, it allowed claims regarding 
technological fields that had not been recognised as patentable previously, such as pharmaceutical, 
chemicals and food products77. However, even after the Brazilian Intellectual Property Law recognized 
such fields as patentable,  the patent may have been granted in a country that is more flexible with 
regards to a novel, inventive or industrial application. Thus, some medicines that should not qualify for 
a Brazilian patent under a conventional analysis might be patented through the pipeline process78. The 
compound could not  have been deemed patentable because it  would have failed,  for  example,  the 
novelty requirement, as it would have been known in other countries79. As HO illustrates, if Brazil 
began granting patents on pharmaceuticals in 1996, a drug that was invented in 1993 would fail to meet 
the novelty requirement in 1996. However, because Brazil provides pipeline protection, the 1993 drug 
could  be  considered  in  the  “pipeline”  of  development  and  thus  be  eligible  for  pipeline  patent 
protection80. Another  problem  with  the  pipeline  mechanism,  according  to  the  critical  analyses  of 
ROSINA,  WANG,  and  CAMPOS,  is  that  it  allows  for  retrospective  patents  of  medicines  already 
invented. The traditional argument for patent protection, that high prices must be assured to provide 
incentives for innovation, does not carry weight when considering innovations that have already been 
brought into the market. Companies benefiting from pipeline patents received an additional reward, at 
great public cost, without having to invest in any additional innovation81. 
During the established one-year period for patent pipeline application (between 1996 and 1997), 1,182 
patent  applications  were  filed  in  Brazil  through  this  mechanism,  many  of  which  are  considered 
essential medicines for diseases such as HIV/AIDS (the drugs lopinavir/ritonavir, efavirenz, abacavir, 
nelfinavir and amprenavir) or cancer (imatinib, sold under the brand name Gleevec). This has led to 
patent protection on at least 340 medicines, keeping many of them well at artificially high prices by 
preventing competition from generic manufacturers82. 
76 CHAVES, Gabriela Costa and REIS, Renata.  Challenges for the universal access to medicines in Brazil –  
brief  comments  from  civil  society.  Available  at  http://www.google.com/url?
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.sxpolitics.org
%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2009%2F04%2Fchallenges-universal-access-
medicines.pdf&ei=fElYUrnMB4Hvswb39YDACw&usg=AFQjCNEs3aXNiIJSaAuOf4vwiYFPV1M-
eQ&bvm=bv.53899372,d.Yms, p. 01.
77 According  to  Médecins  Sans  Frontières  (MSF).  Available  at  http://www.msfaccess.org/our-work/hiv-
aids/article/1307. 
78 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 185.
79 HO, Cynthia. Access to Medicine in the Global Economy: International Agreements on Patents and Related 
Rights. Oxford, 2011, p. 229.
80 HO, Cynthia. ibidem, pp. 229- 230.
81 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 185.
82 According to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), ibidem. 
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3.1.1.3 PROHIBITION OF PARALLEL IMPORTATION
According to the UN High Commissioner, a means of improving access to cheaper drugs is through 
parallel importation83. HESTERMEYER introduced the subject matter of parallel import by firstly ex-
plaining the doctrine of exhaustion, or the first sale doctrine. Patentees of pharmaceutical products have 
no automatic right to market the products, as patents do not grant a positive right to use or market the 
invention, rather they confer negative rights: the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, 
etc. the product. In other words, patents grant the right to exclude others from competing, which allows 
the patent holder to fully exploit the value of the invention. However, as HESTERMEYER continues, 
the right does not give the patentee control over a product after he has placed it on the market himself - 
the product can then be sold, used, or offered for sale freely and without the patentee's permission. The 
patent right has therefore been ‘exhausted’ once the product was placed on the market. This doctrine 
has come to be known as the doctrine of exhaustion, or the first sale doctrine.84   
It follows that once the product was placed on the market by the patent holder (or authorized third 
parties) it can be sold, used, or offered for sale freely and without the patentee's permission for different 
prices in different countries. Parallel importation thus allows the importing of the product from the 
country where it is lawfully sold at a cheaper price85, without necessarily having the consent of the 
patent holder86, due to the exhaustion. 
The concept of exhaustion has raised little controversy where the patent holder places the product on 
the national market and thereby exhausts his rights in the same market (national exhaustion). However, 
whether the same also applies in an international context is one of the most controversial issues in in-
ternational intellectual property law87. As reported in by WHO, WIPO, WTO: 
“[i]n a landmark legal action, a pharmaceutical industry association and 39 of its affiliate  
companies filed complaints at the Pretoria High Court, alleging, among other things, that 
South  Africa’s  law  on  medicines  allowed  for  parallel  importation  of  (HIV/AIDS) 
medicines and was inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. The lawsuit triggered an 
active campaign led by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and AIDS activists. 
During the court procedure, it was revealed that the South African law was based on 
a WIPO model law and in the end, the companies withdrew their complaints uncon-
ditionally in 2001. By that time, many governments and others were convinced that 
the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and public health needed to be clari-
fied”88.
The subject matter is provided for in article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement which states that “[f]or the pur-
poses of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing  
83 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 48.
84 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 68.
85 Non-governmental  organization Grupo  de  Trabalho  sobre  Propriedade  Intelectual  (GTPI)s’  opinion  on 
parallel  importation.  Available  at  http://www.deolhonaspatentes.org.br/default.asp?
siteAcao=mostraPagina&paginaId=1000.
86 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 48.
87 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 68.
88 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 70.
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in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights” . 
The UN High Commissioner and other scholars have interpreted this article to mean that WTO mem-
bers are to free establish the system of international exhaustion they consider appropriate, in other 
words, to decide whether parallel imports will be allowed under national legislation89. Accordingly, the 
WTO organs have conclusively established in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Pub-
lic Health, which clarified some of the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities, that members are free to estab-
lish the system of international exhaustion they consider appropriate90 (in paragraph 5, subparagraph 
d)91. Only this approach allows developing country members to opt for international exhaustion and de-
veloped country members to apply national exhaustion, which better aligns the balance between human 
rights and patent law92. 
The  Commission  on  Intellectual  Property  Rights93 concluded  that  the  most  beneficial  policy  for 
developing countries is to adopt a rule of international exhaustion, allowing them to purchase drugs at 
the lowest price at which the manufacturer offers them anywhere in the world. Developed countries, 
however, should not allow parallel imports in the pharmaceutical area from developing countries. This 
enables companies to price-discriminate and sell their products at low prices in the developing world 
without the price ‘leaking’ into the developed world. However, parallel imports will not lower prices 
below the level at which a manufacturer is willing to sell the drugs94. 
HEATH states that the decision adopted in the Doha Declaration just  mean that whatever national 
stance is taken on the matter of exhaustion, no complaint can be heard in this respect. In his words, 
“[w]hile  this  certainly  means  that  no country  can be  put  in  the  dock  for  deciding  for  or  against  
international exhaustion, it does not necessarily mean that the TRIPS Agreement as such would not  
favour either one or the other position.”95 
HESTERMEYER96 adds that, whilst the right to access to medicine supports the position of leaving 
WTO members to choose the right approach for themselves, its fundamental flaw is apparent: it is not 
dispositive. A member that regards article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement as conclusively establishing 
the patent holder's right to prohibit parallel imports will hardly be swayed by the additional argument 
and might still exert pressure on a WTO member wishing to adopt a rule of international exhaustion97 98.
89 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 187.
90 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 231 and 259. Also WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 182.
91 WHO, WIPO and WTO, ibidem, p. 73.
92 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 234.
93 The Commission was set up by the British government to look at how intellectual property rights might work 
better for poor people and developing countries. Available at http://www.iprcommission.org/home.html.
94 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 231.
95 HEATH,  Christopher.  Parallel  Imports  and  International  Trade.  Available  at 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sme/en/atrip_gva_99/atrip_gva_99_6.pdf, p. 9.
96 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 234.
97 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 234.
98 Accordingly, the UN High Commissioner mentioned that  the  “use of  trade pressure to impose “TRIPS  
plus”-style IP legislation has been noted before CESCR. This could lead member States to implement IP  
standards that do not take into account the safeguards included under the TRIPS Agreement which could  
lead  to  IP  systems  that  are  inconsistent  with  States’ responsibilities  under  human  rights  law”. HIGH 
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Brazil illustrates well this flaw as, although allowed under TRIPS, the country ruled out the possibility 
of parallel importation.
In fact,  Brazil’s 1996 patent  reforms ruled  out  the  possibility  of  parallel  imports  by adopting  the 
principle of national exhaustion of rights and thus failed to make use of an important tool considered 
legitimate by the WTO, which could improve access to medicines99.  This allows patent holders  to 
prevent the import of their products into Brazil by unauthorized parties100, which means, in practice, 
that pharmaceutical companies may set and enforce higher prices for drugs in Brazil when the same 
product is lawfully sold at a cheaper price somewhere else in the world.101
Along  these  lines,  some  non-governmental  organizations  maintain  that  the  current  legislation  is 
contrary to the goals of intellectual property protection established by the Federal Constitution of 1988, 
aimed at the economic and technological development of the country. 
Parallel importation is currently permitted under Brazilian law only if a compulsory license is issued 
for the product. There are currently some projects of law requiring parallel import to be allowed in 
Brazil102.
3.1.2 COUNTER-MEASURES TO INCREASE ACCESS TO MEDICINES
As explained in the sub-chapter 2.1.1 above, in addition to the TRIPS Agreement, Brazilian legislators 
adopted measures that are in fact in opposition to public health concerns such as early implementation, 
patent pipeline and the prohibition of parallel importation. Those measures resulted in a particularly 
difficult transition and constituted a threat to the current health care system in Brazil103. The reaction 
evolved with the adoption of counter-measures to increase the access to medicines. 
The first  salvo  in  the  battle  to  increase  access  to  medicine,  according to  SHAVER,  was  fired  by 
activists fighting to expand access to anti-retroviral medicines (ARVs)104, which resulted in compulsory 
licensing105 in the late 1990s.  The reaction came also with the adoption of other counter-measures by 
the Brazilian government in order to mitigate the effects of TRIPS: the prior consent mechanism, the 
Bolar exception and the Popular Drugstore Program106, analysed below.
COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 27.
99 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, pp. 187-188.
100 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 187.
101 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 187.
102 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 188. Also Non-governmental organization Grupo de Trabalho 
sobre  Propriedade  Intelectual  (GTPI)s’  opinion  on  parallel  importation.  Available  at 
http://www.deolhonaspatentes.org.br/default.asp?siteAcao=mostraPagina&paginaId=1000. 
103 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p 197-198.
104 SHAVER, ibidem, p 10.
105 In this regard, see ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS,  ibidem, and, on compulsory licensing in Brazil and 
South Africa, the HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem.
106 All these measures are well explained by ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem. 
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3.1.2.1 PRICE NEGOTIATIONS AND COMPULSORY LICENSES
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for compulsory licences. Compulsory licensing consists of 
licences granted by the government permitting someone else (or the government itself, which is then 
called ‘government use’107) to produce a patented product or process without the consent of the patent 
owner. 
According to HESTERMEYER, compulsory licences are an important tool for safeguarding access to 
medicines108 once they can serve three goals: (1) safeguarding the supply of the domestic market with a 
patented product;  (2) promoting competition by creating domestic competitors;  or (3) promoting a 
domestic industry109.  Practical experiences show that the bargaining power created by just the legal 
possibility of a compulsory licence can benefit developing countries even where a compulsory licence 
is not actually granted110.
The TRIPS Agreement does not specifically list the reasons that might be used to justify compulsory 
licensing, but attaches several explicit conditions to such a grant, such as authorization on individual 
merits,  prior  negotiations,  adequate  remuneration  and  possibility  of  judicial  review111.   The  Doha 
Declaration, which, as stated above, clarified some of the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities, clarified that 
each WTO member has “the right to grant  compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licences are granted”112.
HESTERMEYER adds  that  much  about  the  interpretation  of  article  31  of  the  TRIPS  Agreement 
remains in doubt and while the right to access to medicine is a useful argument to support a broader 
and more flexible interpretation, it is merely one argument amongst several and fails to provide legal 
security for members wishing to make full use of the flexibilities113.
One of  the  controversial  issues  was the  limitation  of  compulsory  licences  and government  use  to 
predominantly supply the domestic market, considering that  article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement 
restricted  the  grant  of  a  compulsory  licence  for  exports.  This  represented  a  potential  problem for 
countries that do not have production capacity to manufacture a drug, and therefore wished to import 
such products,  to  make use  of  compulsory licences.  article  31(f)  was  revised  following the  Doha 
Declaration to allow  for members granting a compulsory licence for the manufacture of drugs for 
export to members lacking pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities under multiple conditions (such as 
special labelling/colouring of the drugs)114 115. 
107 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 239.
108 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 300.
109 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 239.
110 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 176.
111 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 245.
112 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 73.
113 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 300.
114 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, pp. 61 and 175.
115 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 301.
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3.1.2.1.1 PARAGRAPH 6 SYSTEM
According to the WHO, WIPO and the WTO, the Doha Declaration led to the adoption of a mechanism 
often referred to as the “Paragraph 6 System”, established under the 2003 waiver decision and the 2005 
Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement116. The System provides WTO members with an additional 
flexibility, which  is  a  special  type  of  compulsory  licence  for  export117,  designed  to  deal  with  the 
difficulties  of  WTO members  lacking sufficient  manufacturing capacities  to  make effective  use  of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement, as the agreement then stood118. The essence of the 
System is the grant of a compulsory licence by the exporting country to meet the need(s) identified by 
the importing country119. The System applies in a particular access scenario where an importing country 
needs medicines to deal with a public health problem, but a potential exporting country faces a legal 
impediment because article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement limits supply under a compulsory licence 
predominantly to the domestic market.  The special  export  licence under the System is free of this 
constraint,  enabling  and  indeed  requiring  the  full  production  under  a  compulsory  licence  to  be 
exported. Accordingly, the situation addressed by the System would arise only when a country wishes 
to obtain a particular pharmaceutical product and the product cannot be produced domestically at all, or 
in  sufficient  quantities,  due  to  lack  of  capacity.  The  preferred  producer  of  the  particular  product 
(normally, the cheapest supply that best meets regulatory and quality requirements) is located in a 
country where a patent is in force on that product and needs a compulsory licence in that country to  
produce for export120. 
The Paragraph 6 System might assume a greater significance, considering that implementation of full 
patent  protection  for  pharmaceutical  products  in  India,  coupled  with  the  approaching  expiry  of 
transition periods in LDCs, could make it more difficult in the future to procure generic versions of 
new medicines121. However, according to HESTERMEYER122: 
“the  Decision  is  unlikely  to  restore  to  Members  without  manufacturing  capacity  the 
advantages of the situation before 2005. Before that date, large generic manufacturers in 
India started operations for many drugs already because of the Indian market and Members 
could then simply buy the generic drugs from them. Now, generic manufacturers will often 
have to decide whether to incur the investment necessary to start producing a new generic 
drug on the sole request of a compulsory licence by a small, poor, importing Member. Apart 
from HIV/AIDS drugs, where manufacturers might automatically assume follow-up requests 
from other Members, the necessary economies of scale are unlikely to be reached under the 
Decision. Also, delays caused by the intricate legal mechanism are inevitable”. 
116 This outcome, providing an additional legal pathway for access to medicines, has special significance as the 
sole amendment proposed to any of the WTO multilateral trade agreements since their adoption in 1994. 
WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 177.
117 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, pp. 177 and 224.
118 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, pp. 23 and 224.
119 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p.  225.
120 By 2012, one special export licence under the System has been exercised. In that instance, the licence was 
used by a Canadian company to ship medicines to Rwanda. WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 178.
121 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 179.
122 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 301.
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3.1.2.1.2 COMPULSORY LICENCE IN BRAZIL 
The subject matter was a breakthrough in the battle to increase access to medicine in Brazil.  A brief 
historical introduction is necessary to understand the reasoning behind the issuing of compulsory li-
censes by the Brazilian government. 
As  explained  by  ROSINA,  WANG,  and  CAMPOS123,  faced  with  the  challenge  of  continuing  its 
HIV/AIDS program at a considerably higher cost, the Brazilian government started negotiations in 
2001 with the major pharmaceutical companies. Backed by the threat of compulsory licensing—a pro-
cess permitted under articles 68 to 71 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Act—the government was 
able to effectively negotiate with pharmaceutical suppliers, managing to secure reductions in prices124 
and a technology transfer agreement. Since then, new attempts were made at negotiations, but the res-
ults were less and less effective. In the beginning of 2007, the government experimented with a new 
approach: after several months of unsuccessful negotiations, on April 24, the Ministry of Health de-
clared efavirenz a drug of national public interest, an important ARV drug used by a third of Brazilians 
receiving treatment through a national programme125. On May 4, Presidential Decree no. 6.108 granted 
a compulsory license for the drug’s patents—based on public interest and for non-commercial use only. 
The medicine was initially imported from India, where it was produced off patent126, and later manufac-
tured in Brazil. Brazil reported to the TRIPS Council that it had taken two years to locally produce the 
medicine, partly because the patent law does not require applicants to disclose all information neces-
sary for the commercialization of the end product127.
Brazilian  law allows  for  a  compulsory  licence  when a  patent  holder  exercises  patent  rights  in  an 
abusive manner or by means of an abuse of economic power proven by an administrative or court 
decision. Compulsory licences may also be issued in cases of national emergency or public interest. 
The  terms  “national  emergency”  and  “public  interest”  are  defined  in  the  Presidential  Decree  on 
Compulsory  Licensing  (Decree  2301/99)128.  According  to  the  UN  High  Commissioner,  this  links 
closely with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, which allow for the use of a patent without the 
authorization  of  the  right  holder  in  certain  circumstances,  including  “in  the  case  of  a  national  
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use” 129. 
123 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 190-191.
124 Using the threat of compulsory licensing, the Brazilian government negotiated significant price reductions on 
efavirenz and nelfinavir in 2001, lopinavir in 2003, the combination of lopinavir and ritonavir in 2005, and 
tenofovir in 2006, thus it has demonstrated that legislation which provides for the effective and expeditious 
use of compulsory licences can be a useful asset in negotiating lower prices for ARV. WHO, WIPO, WTO, 
ibidem, p. 176.
125 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 176.
126 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, pp. 190-191.
127 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 176.
128 According to the decree, a national emergency is understood to be a condition of impending danger to the  
public, even if existing only in a part of the national territory. Further, there are considered to be within the 
public  interest  those  facts,  among  others,  related  to  the  public  health,  nutrition,  protection  of  the  
environment,  as  well  as  those  of  primordial  importance  to  the  technological  or  social  and  economic 
development of this country. HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 55. 
129 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 77.
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In  2000,  the  United  States  requested  consultations  with  Brazil  arguing  that  provisions  of  Brazil’s 
industrial  property  law fail  to  comply with the  “local  working”  requirement  for  the  issuance of  a 
compulsory  license.  The  United  States  asserted  that  the  “local  working”  requirement  can  only  be 
satisfied by the local production — and not the importation — of the patented subject-matter. More 
specifically, the United States noted that Brazil’s “local working” requirement stipulates that a patent 
shall  be subject to compulsory licensing if the subject-matter of the patent is not “worked” in the 
territory of Brazil. The United States further noted that Brazil explicitly defines “failure to be worked” 
as “failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture of the product” or “failure to make full use of the 
patented process”. The United States considered that such a requirement is inconsistent with Brazil’s 
obligations under articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, and article III of the GATT 1994130. In 
response, NGOs complained using the language of human rights and the right to health. The United 
States  and Brazil  subsequently notified the WTO Dispute Settlement  Body that  a  mutually  agreed 
understanding had been reached to settle the dispute. In fact, according to DUNCAN, the United States 
had stepped back from further confrontation on this issue, subject to a bilateral understanding to the 
effect that, should Brazil seek to issue a compulsory license on grounds of failure to work the patent 
locally, it would consult the United States before doing so131. 
The continued existence of the safeguard provisions on compulsory licences in Brazil was considered 
by the Report of the UN High Commissioner on the impact of the TRIPS Agreement as being helpful in 
improving the implementation of the Brazilian HIV treatment programme132.
3.1.2.2 THE PRIOR CONSENT MECHANISM 
The prior consent mechanism is another attempt to improve access to medicines in Brazil. Until 2001, 
the  Brazilian  Industrial  Property  Office  (INPI)  was  the  only  body  authorized  to  consider  patent 
applications for pharmaceutical products. Brazilian federal law 10.196/01, however, instituted the prior 
consent mechanism, providing that the grant of patents for pharmaceutical products and processes shall 
be  subject  to  prior  consent  by  the  National  Health  Surveillance  Agency  (Agência  Nacional  de 
Vigilância  Sanitária -  ANVISA),  an autonomous  regulatory  agency which,  among other  functions, 
administers  the  National  Sanitary  Surveillance  System,  monitors  prices  of  drugs  and  medical 
equipment, and regulates and inspects the production of generic medicines in the country133. 
According to ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, it means that when an application for a pharmaceutical 
patent is filed, the INPI first analyses whether it meets patentability and formal requirements that have 
been determined by the Brazilian Industrial Property Act. The applications are then sent to ANVISA for 
a second and separate analysis. This second stage of review is intended to guard against the danger that 
a weak examination process could lead to the granting of a patent to an already patented product or 
process, which results in the extension of protection, delaying the generic manufacturer's entry into the 
market134. Strict patentability criteria and strict patent examination supported by patenting examination 
guidelines contribute to prevent strategies employed to delay the entry of generic competition, such as 
130 Dispute  Settlement  DS199.  Brazil  —  Measures  Affecting  Patent  Protection.  Available  in 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds199_e.htm.
131 DUNCAN, ibidem, p. 13.
132 DUNCAN, ibidem, p. 14.
133 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 191-192.
134 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 191-192.
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“ever-greening”135, a process where minor innovations to patented innovations are themselves patented, 
which can effectively extend the life of the patent beyond the original granted period and hold up other 
research efforts136. 
3.1.2.3 THE REGULATORY REVIEW EXCEPTION (BOLAR EXCEPTION)
Another TRIPS flexibility analysed herein is provided for in article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement which 
states that: 
“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a 
patent,  provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties”. 
According to HESTERMEYER137, the precise scope of the permissible exceptions is hard to gauge as 
the wording of article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement is notoriously vague. A WTO Dispute Settlement 
Panel138 has defined the term as “the exception under which use of the patented product for scientific  
experimentation, during the term of the patent and without consent, is not an infringement”139. The 
Bolar exception and research exception or experimental use exception140 are commonly cited as types 
of “limited exceptions”141.
 
A Bolar exception142 allows third parties to manufacture limited quantities of patented drugs without 
seeking a license, specifically for approval purposes. The purpose is to facilitate the availability of 
generic drugs as soon as the patent of a branded drug falls  into the public domain143.  Because the 
approval process can be lengthy, Bolar exception patents can reduce the time it takes for generic drugs 
to reach the market.
According to ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, the introduction of generic versions of branded drugs 
in the market improves access to medicines because prices are immediately lowered through new com-
petition. As the government spends less to buy the same drugs, it also becomes possible to buy larger 
quantities and bargain for even better prices144.
135 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 13. 
136 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 40
137 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 235.
138 Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents: Dispute Settlement DS114. Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical  
Products. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds114_e.htm.
139 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 134.
140  The experimental use exception allows science to progress despite the fact that a technology is patented.  
HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 238
141 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 238.
142 The name Bolar originates from a lawsuit brought in U.S. courts between Roche Products Inc. and Bolar  
Pharmaceutical Co in 1984. It is also known in literature as early working of the patent. ROSINA, WANG,  
and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 195.
143 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, pp. 194-195.
144 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 194.
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The Bolar exception was analysed by the WTO in the Panel  Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents145. As 
HESTERMEYER explains, the adequacy of two provisions of the Canadian Patent Act to the TRIPS 
Agreement were discussed: the first was a Bolar exception and the second a Stockpiling exception. A 
Stockpiling  exception  allows  competitors  who  invoked  the  Bolar  exception  to  manufacture  and 
stockpile the patented goods during a period of six months before the expiration of the patent, so that 
they have a sufficient amount of goods on stock, as well as the possibility of marketing their product 
domestically or abroad, so they could start selling the product immediately upon the expiration of the 
patent term.146
The Panel held that article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes three criteria that a measure must 
meet to qualify for the exception: (i) it must be ‘limited’, (ii) it must not ‘unreasonably conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the patent’, and (iii) it must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests  
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties. The Panel adopted a very 
narrow definition of the term ‘limited’,  arguing that the term ‘exception’ already implies a limited 
derogation which is narrowed even further by the word ‘limited’ and concluded that the Stockpiling 
exception was not limited, as it allowed competitors to ‘make’ and ‘use’ the patented product during the 
last six months of the patent term without imposing any limitation on the production of goods. The 
Bolar exception, on the other hand, was considered limited, as it only allowed very few acts of making 
and using the patented product, namely those necessary for the regulatory approval process only147. The 
panel added that the measure must not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent, 
which consists of the right to exclude competition during the patent term. The Panel went further and 
considered a period of market exclusivity after the expiration of the patent term to be part of the normal 
exploitation, as competitors need some time to build an inventory before they can enter the market. In 
contrast,  it  considered  the  additional  period  of  market  exclusivity  gained  because  of  a  regulatory 
approval process not to be part of the normal exploitation of the patent, so that a Bolar exception does  
not conflict with the normal exploitation148. 
According to HESTERMEYER, the vague wording used in article 30 of the TRIPS provides an entry 
point for the right to access to medicine149, but, considering the above mentioned Panel, the WTO failed 
to do so. According to the author150, the Panel focused exclusively on the interests of the patent holder 
and its inquiry whether these interests are compelling, absent any basis for such a requirement, seem to 
indicate that it will let the rights holder's interests prevail where these are compelling. The Panel took 
into consideration the legitimate interests of the patent holder, but not, at least not in equal footing, the 
interests of third parties, of which access to medicine indubitably is one. Finally, HESTERMEYER 
145 Dispute  Settlement  DS114.  Canada  -  Patent  Protection  of  Pharmaceutical  Products.  Available  at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds114_e.htm.
146 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 235.
147 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 235.
148 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 235.
149 HESTERMEYER states that “[w]ith respect to limited exceptions under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement  
access to medicine mitigates in favour of a broad interpretation. In particular, access to medicine has to be  
taken into account in defining ‘normal’ exploitation and ‘legitimate’ interests and Article 30 of the TRIPS  
Agreement has to be read as an exception to the rule of  non-discrimination in Article 27 of the TRIPS  
Agreement”. HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 235.
150 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 237.
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mentions that, due to the narrow interpretation of the provision in the Panel Canada - Pharmaceutical 
Patents, the WTO would not permit an exception under article 30 that could meaningfully enhance 
access to medicine in the developing world, such as governmental non-commercial use—permitting the 
government to produce the medicine and to provide it to parts of the population151.  
3.1.2.3.1 BOLAR EXCEPTION IN BRAZIL
Brazilian law 10.196/2001 created a Bolar exception,  speeding up the administrative procedures to 
enable the immediate entry of generic versions of drugs into the pharmaceutical market once patents 
expire152.
However, in 2006 a Bill was proposed in Congress (PLS n. 29/2006) requiring whoever requests the 
registry of a drug within the Brazilian health surveillance agency to prove themselves as the owner of 
the related  patent – a single sentence requirement with a huge impact on access to medicine as it 
provides a linkage between patent protection and medicine registration.  According to CHAVES and 
REIS, if approved, the Bolar exception would be annulled and this is very compelling evidence of how 
TRIPS-plus provisions are trying to make their way beyond bilateral or regional free trade agreements 
in developing countries153 (further explained in sub-chapter 2.1.3.1). The bill was rejected in 2009154.
3.1.2.4 POPULAR DRUGSTORE PROGRAM
Another  example  of  a  step  taken  by  the  Brazilian  government  to  promote  access  to  medicines 
mentioned by ROSINA, WANG and CAMPOS is the Popular Drugstore Program. . Created by Decree 
5.090/04, this measure was originally designed to improve access to essential medicines for patients 
that use the private health system, as private health insurance policies typically do not cover out-patient 
drug costs. In practice, however, the program has been widely used by patients when public hospitals 
fail to provide the medicines on time155. 
The program works  both through state-sponsored drugstores  and private  drugstores  that  choose to 
participate.  The  Ministry  of  Health  buys  medicines  from  private  and  public  industries  and  the 
participating drugstores resell them at up to 90% below market prices156. 
There is an ongoing debate over whether the government can establish a program that provides access 
to medicines at some cost when there is a constitutional right to health granting the right to receiving 
them at no cost at all. ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS concluded that the budget constraint is a reality 
to be taken into consideration and that it would be detrimental for courts to eliminate initiatives such as  
the Popular Drugstore Program that fall short of the ideal constitutional expectation of free access, 
since  popular  drugstores  have  been  effective  in  expanding  access  to  medicines,  especially  for 
Brazilians with lower incomes157. 
151 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 239.
152 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, p. 195.
153 CHAVES and REIS, ibidem.
154 Available at http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=76662.
155 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, pp. 195-197.
156 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, pp. 195-197.
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3.1.3 COMMENTS ON PATENTS AND DISTRIBUTION
The impact of patents on access is complex158. On the one side, the pharmaceutical sector depends on 
patents to shoulder the high costs of testing, development and approval of goods; in addition, some 
innovations, as in the case of pharmaceuticals, are generally relatively easy to reverse-engineer and 
thus are open to easy copying in the absence of intellectual property159.  Moreover, patents requires 
disclosure, and so facilitate the production of generic versions when the patent term expires. They also 
provide a more secure environment for the transfer of technology, especially for developing countries, 
as well as a useful instrument for obtaining finance (venture)160. On the other hand, patents may create 
barriers to the enjoyment of fundamental rights, especially by increasing the price and creating a barrier 
for generic versions.
HELFER and AUSTIN state that, as a matter of principle, flexibility mechanisms provide breathing 
space  for  governments  to  promote  a  wide range of  objectives  that  conflict  or  are  in  tension  with 
expansive intellectual property protection rules, but they are insufficiently connected to the protection 
of fundamental rights and freedoms161. The WTO interpretation of article 30 of TRIPS Agreement in 
the Panel Canada-Patent, mentioned in sub-chapter 2.1.2.3, denotes this assertion.
This  dilemma  of  where  to  strike  the  balance  between  protecting  intellectual  property  rights  and 
promoting public access to knowledge is evident in the above case study of patents and access to 
medicines in Brazil, which reflects the uncertainty and discussion about how to accommodate human 
rights within the WTO. In fact, there is a constant battle between the adoption of measures towards 
stricter patent protection and towards greater access to medicines.  
3.1.3.1 TRIPS-PLUS
There is a prevailing interference of economic private interest in the arena of intellectual property162 
and this may lead to the adoption of standards of intellectual property protection higher than those 
required under TRIPS Agreement or to the adoption of measures aimed at reducing the effectiveness of 
limitations on rights under the TRIPS Agreement163.  These measures are commonly know as  TRIPS-
plus and may result from multi-lateral, plurilateral, regional and/or national intellectual property rules 
and practices and  have the effect of increasing the level of protection for patent right holders and 
reducing  the  ability  of  developing  countries  to  protect  the  public  interest,  including  health, 
157 ROSINA, WANG, and CAMPOS, ibidem, pp. 195-197.
158 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 13.
159 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 37.
160 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 13.
161 HELFER and AUSTIN, ibidem, pp. 508-509.
162 HELFER and AUSTIN, ibidem, p. 505.
163 MUSUNGU and DUTFIELD, ibidem, p. 3.
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environment, food and nutrition164. In other words, the adoption of TRIPS-plus provisions may result in 
a patent system that is inconsistent with States’ responsibilities under human rights law165.
In fact, there has been an increasing tendency in the arena of intellectual property for countries to enter 
into economic integration arrangements, such as free trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties and 
other  economic integration arrangements in various bilateral  and regional configurations -  as those 
terms  overlap,  hereinafter  the  term free  trade  agreements  (FTAs)  will  refer  to  any  kind  of  trade 
agreement166 _,  in parallel with multilateral agreements, a development that is presenting significant 
systemic challenges for the multilateral system167 as it impose obligations with respect to patent law 
that threaten the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement that have so fervently been fought for168. 
As HESTERMEZER169 pointed out, this web of international obligations in the patent field has a triple 
effect. Firstly, it often obligates developing countries to not make use of the flexibilities of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  Secondly,  it  commonly  imposes  minimum  patent  standards  that  go  well  beyond  the 
standards put down in the TRIPS Agreement. Thirdly, its intricate structure involving multiple treaties 
with  slightly  different  provisions  adds  to  the  pro-patent  argumentative  ammunition  of  developed 
countries, discouraging developing countries from using any of the flexibilities to avoid pressure, even 
where technically they might be allowed to use the flexibilities. HESTERMEZER explains that:  
“[FTAs vary] widely, from merely reiterating TRIPS provisions to explicitly limiting 
TRIPS flexibilities or imposing additional obligations: eg some FTAs require patent 
term extension for the factual curtailment of the patent term as a result of the market-
ing approval process of pharmaceuticals, some the grant of ‘new use’ patents, others 
ban parallel imports, limit the grounds for the grant of compulsory licences, or re-
quire more extensive protection of test data. Even where these agreements simply re-
164 By limiting the ability of these countries to: (i) promote technological innovation and to facilitate the transfer  
and dissemination of  technology;  (ii)  take necessary measures  to  protect  public  health,  nutrition and to 
promote  the  public  interest  in  sectors  of  vital   importance  to  their  socio-economic  and  technological  
development; or, (iii) take appropriate measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right  
holders or the resort by right holders to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the  
international  transfer  of  technology.  MUSUNGU,  Sisule  F,  and  DUTFIELD,  Graham.  Multilateral  
Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 2003. Available 
at  http://www.quno.org/resource/2003/12/multilateral-agreements-and-trips-plus-world-world-intellectual-
property, p. 3.
165 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 27.
166 “These agreements have been dubbed regional  trade agreements  (RTAs),  free trade agreements  (FTAs),  
bilateral trade agreements (BTAs), or (the term used in recent reports by the World Bank and the WTO)  
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), reflecting the fact that many agreements are not “regional” but can  
cover  countries  which  are geographically  dispersed,  and that  such  agreements  provide  for  preferential  
tariffs on many goods. These terms often overlap, and several can, in effect, apply to the same agreement,  
depending on the characteristics of the agreement being considered. For the purposes of this study, the term  
“FTAs” is used in reference to any kind of trade agreement”. WHO, WIPO and WTO, ibidem, p. 83.
167 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 83.
168 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 287.
169 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, pp. 291-292.
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peat TRIPS language, they can limit a country's TRIPS Agreement flexibilities, as the 
FTAs are interpreted independently of the TRIPS Agreement. Also, decisions taken 
by the WTO in the context of the TRIPS Agreement, such as the Doha Declaration, 
(…) are not  binding with  respect  to  the FTAs.  (...)  It  is  not  just  the  flexibilities 
already achieved that are at risk, but also the ability to further change and develop 
the  TRIPS  Agreement  system—at  least  to  the  extent  that  standards  are  to  be 
weakened”. 
These kinds of agreements are in general  legal and within the margin of appreciation170 of  States. 
Depending  on  the  situation,  however,  competition  law  can  play  an  important  role  as  a  potential 
correcting factor171. 
In its 2012 report on the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)172, the UN noted 
that  TRIPS  flexibilities  facilitating  local  manufacturing  and  importation  of  essential  medicines 
appeared to be more broadly incorporated in national laws, but that the use of these flexibilities may be 
hampered by FTAs173. 
Doctrine illustrates as a clear example of external pressure the Section  301 of the US Trade Act of 
1974. As explained in sub-chapter 2.1.1.1, Section 301 proved to be an effective tool in promoting US 
interests  and,  regarding  the  Brazilian  access  to  medicines,  it  led  to  the  adoption  of  patent  on 
pharmaceuticals earlier than required under  TRIPS Agreement. Sub-chapter 2.1.1.2 introduced patent 
pipeline, which can be appointed as another example of a measure adopted as a result  of political 
pressure from developed countries or private industries174.  Other  measures mentioned in chapter 2.1, 
including the prohibition of parallel importation and the bill to annul the Bolar exception, may also be a 
consequence of trade pressure.
This  sort  of  trade  pressure,  together  with  the  analysis  in  chapter  1.2  of  the  fragmentation  of 
international law and that States tend to abide by the rules of the regime with the strongest enforcement  
mechanism175, which, in comparison to human rights fora, is the WTO system, makes the balance of 
human rights and patent law impaired in practice. 
170 The term "margin of appreciation” refers to a doctrine of judicial deference developed by the European Court 
of Human Rights and means the “degree of discretion that a human rights tribunal is willing to grant national 
decision makers who seek to fulfil their obligations under a human right treaty”. HELFER, Laurence R.  
Adjudicating  Copyright  Claims  Under  the  TRIPs  Agreement:  The  Case  for  a  European Human Rights  
Analogy, 39 Harvard  International  Law  Journal  357-441  (1998).  Available  at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2020.
171 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 183.
172 The MDGs are a set of eight international development goals – all of them related in some way to  
improving physical, mental and social well-being - to be achieved by 2015. WHO, WIPO, WTO, 
ibidem, p. 42.
173 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 42. Also, DREYFUSS, ibidem, pp. 11-12.
174 HO, Cynthia, ibidem, pp. 229. Also, according to Médecins Sans Frontières, “[p]ipeline patents are a ‘TRIPS 
Plus’ mechanism, that is they introduce intellectual property barriers to accessing affordable medicines over  
and above what is the international minimum standard”. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES,  ibidem.
175 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 298.
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3.1.3.2 REACTION IN ORDER TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO MEDICINES
According to SHAVER, over time, activists fighting to expand access to medicines were joined by oth-
er groups with common interests in making products or data available in the public domain, including 
farmers in the developing world concerned about rights over seeds, educators concerned about access 
to learning materials and even software developers disturbed by the expansion of patents to computer 
code, forming a loose movement under the banner of “access to knowledge”176. Regarding access to 
medicines, the pressure from these activists may result, for example, in the adoption of flexibilities per-
mitted under TRIPS, as it was noticed in the case of compulsory licence regarding HIV drugs (sub-
chapter 2.1.2.1) and the lawsuit against South Africa regarding the allowance of parallel importation 
(sub-chapter 2.1.1.3). 
Another reaction consists of the creation of alternatives models such as open source (see sub-chapter 
2.2) and patent pools177, as well as measures to stimulate research regarding neglected subjects, such as, 
among others, grants178, prizes179, advance market commitments180, tax breaks for companies181, priority 
review vouchers182, and a proposal to negotiate an international treaty on  research and development 
(R&D) for neglected diseases183. To round up this chapter, an overview of an open source model adop-
ted in Brazil to foster innovation in the biotechnology sector is presented. 
176 SHAVER, ibidem, p. 11.
177 See footnote 14.
178 A grant  can stimulate  small  or  medium-sized enterprise  to  finance initial  research for  a  medicine on a 
neglected disease and bring a potential  new medicine through Phase I  trials,  at  which stage it  may be 
possible to attract commercial funding. Grants are paid irrespective of the results achieved.  WHO, WIPO, 
WTO, ibidem, p. 117.
179 “Prizes work as a pull mechanism in R&D by increasing the rewards for success, thereby making investment  
more attractive and the delivery of a specific product more likely.” WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 117.
180 “Advance market commitment (AMC) agreements aim to create greater incentives for the R&D of a specific  
product either through market creation or through risk reduction.” WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 118.
181 Tax credits for R&D expenditures enables companies to account for expenditure on R&D against their tax  
liabilities. See WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 118. The US federal Orphan Drug Act, which was introduced 
in 1983 to address research and development in rare or "orphan" diseases, entitles the company undertaking 
the research to tax advantages and extended marketing exclusivity. GIBSON, Intellectual property, medicine  
and health. Current debates, Ashgate, 2009, p. 181. 
182 “A priority review voucher (PRV) is a scheme which aims to reward companies that develop health products  
that address small markets or limited patient groups as is the case also with neglected diseases. The PRV  
entitles a company to receive priority review (i.e. quicker review by the responsible regulatory authority) for  
any additional health products that would not otherwise qualify for priority review. A company can use this  
scheme to advance the marketing date of a potential “blockbuster” product, thus generating increased and  
earlier revenues from that product”. WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 119.
183 See WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 119.
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3.2 ONSA NETWORK’S GENOMA PROGRAM. INNOVATION PERSPECTIVE 
This section presents a case study of São Paulo’s “virtual institute” for genomics research: the Organiz-
ation for Nucleotide Sequencing and Analysis, or ONSA Network, launched in 1997.  The case shows 
Brazil’s efforts to stimulate development in an emerging biotechnology sector184, using an open source 
model. 
Open source models first appeared in the field of software development as a reaction to legal protec-
tion185 and were later adopted in other fields as copyright, biotechnology and drug discovery186.
Open source drug discovery and development builds on two principles borrowed from open source 
software development. First, open source drug discovery is based on the idea of collaboration, i.e. or-
ganizing and motivating groups of independent researchers to contribute to research projects. Second, it 
is based on an open approach to patents which makes the outcome of that research generally available, 
either through the public domain or through the use of customized licences187. 
According to the 2013 WHO, WIPO, WTO Report, the success of open source models in the informa-
tion technology (e.g. web technology and the Linux operating system) and biotechnology (e.g. human 
genome sequencing) sectors highlights both the need and the potential to initiate a similar model in 
health care, such as an open source model for drug discovery. Several open source drug discovery pro-
jects are currently under way. Most have secured financing either in the form of government grants or 
from philanthropic sources. These funds are used to cover administrative expenses and may also be 
used to fund access to laboratories, computer facilities and payment to researchers188. 
The ONSA Network is an open research model for access to knowledge, which works in the following 
way: the foundation of the ONSA Network is based on a system of coordination between laboratories, 
facilitated by public funding189, with a decentralized decision-making process but working towards a 
single goal. As OCTAVIANI explains, the membership of this network is open to any researcher who is 
willing to participate and is granted by a contract between the participating laboratory and the São 
Paulo State Foundation for Research Assistance (FAPESP). Under the terms of the contract, sequencing 
laboratories receive DNA material, equipment, training and a specified payment per base pair of fin-
ished sequence. In return, members are obliged to share results in a central data repository through the 
internet, at a prescribed standard of quality, within one year. As soon as a laboratory successfully deliv-
ers a sequence, it can apply for a second assignment190. How they achieve this sequence is up to the par-
ticipating laboratory. Each individual laboratory is responsible for its own project management in a 
democratic organization of production towards a single scientific objective. In this way, the project’s 
184 SHAVER, ibidem, p. 7.
185 MIZUKAMI, Pedro Nicoletti and LEMOS, Ronaldo. From Free Software to Free Culture: the Emergence of  
Open Business. in Access to knowledge in Brazil. Lea Shaver (editor), 2nd edition, Bloomsbury Academia,  
p. 13.
186 See a model of an Indian open source drug discovery at WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 119.
187 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 117.
188 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 117.
189 OCTAVIANI, Alessandro. Biotechnology in Brazil: Promoting Open Innovation. in Access to knowledge in  
Brazil. Lea Shaver (editor), 2nd edition,  Bloomsbury Academia, 2010, pp. 136-137.
190 OCTAVIANI, ibidem, p. 137.
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founders seek to build comparable genomics research capabilities, but at a lower cost and shorter start-
up time191. 
To sum up, the ONSA Network is based on three key elements: (i) a research environment stimulated 
by a state agency in coordination with universities and public funding agencies, (ii) decentralized im-
plementation, and (iii) virtual publication of data via the internet192.
OCTAVIANI concludes that the ONSA Network empowered peripheral laboratories in two ways: 
“[f]irst, participation in the project was open to laboratories with no previous experi-
ence in DNA sequencing. The project funding enabled such laboratories to purchase 
state-of-the-art DNA sequencing machines, and to train their student technicians in 
its operation. In this way, research tools and the relevant technical expertise spread 
throughout the state university system. Second, because the participating laboratories 
were encouraged to work in tandem on a common project, the joint accomplishments 
were of a scope that none of the laboratories could have achieved independently”193. 
The accomplishments so far achieved under the ONSA Network are impressive and have helped to 
forge a reputation for Brazilian science in a field previously dominated by researchers in more de-
veloped countries194. OCTAVIANI sums up: 
“[i]n 1999 the Genoma Program achieved its original goal, producing the world’s 
first complete genomic sequence of a plant pathogen. (…) Two new goals were set in 
1998: sequencing 50,000 sugar cane genes involved in plant development and sugar 
content and investigating their roles in resistance to diseases and adverse climate and 
soil conditions. The ONSA Network began its first project with human health applic-
ations in 1999. The Human Cancer Genome Project identified one million sequences 
of Brazil’s most frequently-occurring tumors before the end of the following year. 
The Clinical Cancer Genome Project was later established to develop new diagnosis 
and treatment methods based on these genetic insights. Soon thereafter, ONSA Net-
work established a project to sequence genes of a parasite responsible for schisto-
somiasis,  an  under-researched  disease  endemic  to  parts  of  Brazil.  In  addition  to 
achieving ever more ambitious sequencing goals, the Genoma Program’s objectives 
in the area of technical capacity-building were also a success195. 
OCTAVIANI also points out that this open research model has since been successfully applied to other 
public research goals and that its success demonstrates that non-proprietary approaches to scientific re-
search can be highly successful and efficient196. 
191 OCTAVIANI, ibidem, p. 134.
192 OCTAVIANI, ibidem, p. 136.
193 OCTAVIANI, ibidem, p. 138.
194 OCTAVIANI, ibidem, p. 138.
195 OCTAVIANI, ibidem, p. 135.
196 OCTAVIANI, ibidem, p. 141.
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In fact, the role of the patent system in developing a new medical technology depends not only on le-
gislative and regulatory settings, but also on a variety of choices made by individuals, from a public-
sector research programme or a private-sector company, at different stages of the development process, 
as to whether and when to obtain patent rights, and how to exercise them. They may rely on exclusive 
commercial  positions,  or  may  draw  from  a  range  of  nonexclusive  and  open  licensing  structures, 
waivers of rights and specific non-assertion undertakings197. 
3.2.1 COMMENTS ON PATENTS AND INNOVATION 
3.2.1.1 PATENTS AND PUBLIC FUNDED RESEARCHES
Considering that patents are limited commercial rights and that they are essentially driven towards eco-
nomic reward198, as studied in the first part of this work (sub-chapter 1.1), there is an ongoing discus-
sion if patent protection should be granted to research conducted in public universities/organisations or 
with public funding, or if an open research model would be more suitable for the purpose of promoting 
innovation199. 
In reviewing the patent system in the context of the broad sweep of innovation policies, the 2013 
WHO, WIPO, WTO Report distinguishes three mechanisms for promoting innovation: (i) publicly fun-
ded innovation carried out by academic institutions and public research organizations; (ii) publicly fun-
ded research undertaken by private firms – notably through public procurement, research subsidies, soft 
loans, R&D tax credits and innovation prizes; (iii) privately financed and executed R&D, financed 
through the marketplace rather than government revenues and incentivized through the patent system, 
which is one mechanism of government policy that promotes innovation200. 
In the pharmaceutical sector there has been significant interaction between universities and public in-
stitutions, which carries out the basic research, and the private sector, which develops and commercial-
izes medicines based on this research201, and it is not easy to distinguish when the public sphere ends 
and the private starts. Moreover, while open source initiatives seem ideally suited to promote pre-com-
petitive research, they do not as yet have the capacity to ensure delivery of finished health products to 
patients or to ensure that products are steered through costly development phases. As a consequence, 
open source initiatives have had only a minor impact on public health202. 
197 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 126.
198 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 38.
199 The events surrounding HIV/AIDS medication served as a catalyst for the debate once, despite the fact that 
much of the research for the first AIDS drug AZT was conducted by publicly funded institutions, a private 
corporation  obtained  patents  in  many  countries  for  the  use  of  AZT  in  the treatment  of  AIDS. 
HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 293.  In fact, “[t]he fact that BW could obtain a patent on the use of AZT in  
AIDS treatment seems surprising considering that the compound was synthesized by Horwitz with US public  
funding, tested for antiretroviral activity by Ostertag with German public funding and tested for activity  
against HIV by the NCI, again with US public funding”. HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 6.
200 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 108.
201 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 106.
202 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 117.
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In the lawmaking sphere the tendency is towards the extension of patents to universities and govern-
ment institutions.  In this  regard,  it  is worth mentioning as an example of greater patent protection 
Brazil’s 2004 Innovation Law. This was inspired by the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act 5203, which actively en-
couraged university researchers to seek and commercially exploit patents on their academic discover-
ies204, as well as affirmed the rights of universities and other public-sector researchers over research 
resulting from external federal funding205. A number of universities have developed extensive patents 
portfolios and many of the new companies focusing on biotechnology are originally spin-offs from uni-
versities206.
DREYFUSS mentions scholars who turned their attention to licensing limitations in an attempt to deal 
with the tendency to extend patents. As an example, Yochai Benkler and his coauthors have worked on 
a solution against the increasing tendency of universities to patent work that would previously have 
gone into the public domain. They advocate something called “Equitable Access” licensing: universit-
ies could continue to patent, but they would be obliged to require licenses to engage in various public 
interest  related activities.  Geertrui  Van Overwalle  suggests that universities should engage in  “two 
tiered” or “dual” licensing, where they would modify their royalty schemes according to the status of 
the licensee or its intended use: license out their technology cheaply if the use was for humanitarian or 
developmental purposes, while charging commercial entities much more207. But the practical and polit-
ical feasibly of such solutions are questionable. 
3.2.1.2 UNDUE RESTRICTIONS ON RESEARCH
The UN High Commissioner added that the grant and exercise of intellectual property can lead to un-
due restrictions on medical research, which could run contrary to the requirement under article 15 of 
the ICESCR to balance the protection of private interests with the promotion of the wide dissemination 
of medical knowledge. It was mentioned, in particular, that the practice of granting broad patents can 
lead to patents being used to block research efforts. This issue is relevant where research into a final  
product or process relies on several levels of innovation, all of which are susceptible to patent protec-
tion. In such cases, patents on innovations from the early stages of research can be used to control and 
possibly block life-saving innovations that depend on the use of the first innovation. 
This issue has become particularly prevalent in the area of biomedical research208 and brings one more 
argument in favour of an open access model for new fields of research. In this connection, DREY-
FUSS209 mentions a study by SAFRIN, in which it was stated that patent rights in sequences of small 
fragments of genes are controversial because very little real work is needed to find them, very little is 
known about what they do even after their genetic sequence is determined, and yet their scope can be 
quite broad. Research efforts relating to them risk being blocked by a patent. For SAFRIN, banning 
203 See, e.g., Bayh Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000), leading case in the US on permitting universities to 
own patent rights in federally funded research.
204 DREYFUSS, ibidem, p. 11. 
205 GIBSON, ibidem, p. 180. 
206 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 106.
207 DREYFUSS, ibidem, p. 17-18.
208 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 40.
209 DREYFUSS, ibidem, p. 17
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patents  on this  subject  manner  would  therefore  be very welcome210.  Accordingly, the  2013  WHO, 
WIPO, WTO Report mentioned that it is unclear whether the patent system provides incentives for in-
vention that is far from market application, such as basic science research211.
Moreover, according to the UN High Commissioner, the WHO has identified situations where stand-
ards for the grant of patents can contribute to ever-greening, a process where minor innovations to pat-
ented innovations are themselves patented, which can effectively extend the life of the patent beyond 
the  original  granted  period  and  hold  up  other  research  efforts212,  as  already  mentioned  in  section 
2.1.2.2. 
3.2.1.3 UNPROTECTED TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
The UN High Commissioner also highlighted that traditional medicines play an important role in the 
health care of all countries, and that while existing patent systems can promote the health care innova-
tions of these communities, the particular nature of this knowledge and of the knowledge holders might 
require significant adaptation or amendments to be made to intellectual property legislation for protec-
tion to be comprehensive since traditional medicines have been appropriated, adapted and patented 
with little or no compensation to the original knowledge holders and without their prior consent213. 
3.2.1.4 ORPHAN DISEASES
Another concern is that in a purely patented model, innovations that might be important - from a human 
rights rather than a business perspective - are less likely to be pursued. In this regard, innovation in 
medical technologies for neglected diseases214 suffers from market failure as conventional patent-based 
incentives do not correspond with the nature of demand for treatments of these diseases. A key factor is 
the limited purchasing power of both governments and patients in the countries where such diseases 
predominate215. 
These "orphan drugs", most of then tropical and subtropical diseases of developing countries216, in par-
ticular tuberculosis and malaria217, as well as their development and improvement, are a key concern for 
the WHO, according to which: “questions remain as to whether the patent system will ensure invest-
ment for medicines needed by the poor. Of the 1,223 new chemical entities developed between 1975  
and 1996, only 11 were for the treatment of tropical diseases”218. 
210 SAFRIN, Sabrina.  Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological Promise: The International Conflict to  
Control the Building Blocks of Life. American Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, October 2004; American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 98, October 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=658421.
211 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 108.
212 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 40
213 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 26, 40-51.
214 Rare diseases or where the market for suitable medicines and treatments is small. GIBSON, ibidem, p. 181.
215 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 115.
216 GIBSON, ibidem, p. 181.
217 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 38 and 44. 
218 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 44.
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As previously mentioned, some measures have been adopted to address neglected diseases such  as 
open source drug discovery and development, grants, prizes, advance market commitments, tax breaks 
for companies, patent pools and priority review vouchers219. However, theses initiatives have had only a 
minor impact on public health - as explained in sub-chapter 2.2.1.1 - especially in developing countries. 
219 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, pp. 116-119. See footnotes 178 to 183.
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4 TOWARDS SOLVING THE PROBLEM
As explained in the first part of this work,  according to WTO jurisprudence, non-WTO treaties and 
general international law can be used merely as an aid for interpreting the covered agreements, as long 
as they do not contradict  WTO agreements. In addition, where human rights law is in conflict with 
WTO law, states will tend to abide by the rulings of WTO dispute settlement organs due to its more  
effective enforcement mechanism in comparison to the human rights system. In conclusion, the balance 
between human rights and patent law is in practice impaired. 
In addition,  the  intellectual  property regime of some WTO members  is  strongly shaped by global 
regulations, particularly the terms of the TRIPS Agreement220. The case “Pharmaceutical Patents on 
Access to Medicines in Brazil” illustrates the impact of the TRIPS Agreement in the Brazilian health 
care system and how the country struggles to balance the compliance with TRIPS with the maintenance 
of its health care system. Considering the current international scenario, a WTO member cannot merely 
rely on the right to access to medicine as a defence against a claim of violation of WTO law absent a  
basis for the defence in the covered agreements221.
Considering  these  findings,  according  to  HESTERMEYER222,  a  first  step  solution  to  the  conflict 
between the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicine  — at the core a conflict between WTO and 
human rights law— can only be achieved by giving human rights law a stronger status within the WTO 
system223. 
But how could the WTO Agreements better accommodate human rights? The UN High Commissioner 
stated that an important aspect of the human rights approach to intellectual property protection is the 
express linkage of human rights in  relevant  legislation.  This  would clearly link States’ obligations 
under international trade law and human rights law. The UN High Commissioner then concluded that 
this would assist States to implement the “permitted exceptions” in the TRIPS Agreement in line with 
their obligations under the ICESCR224. 
According to HESTERMEYER, such an amendment could take the form of a WTO human rights 
treaty or it could include the ICCPR and the ICESCR by reference, or the creation of an exception 
allowing members to break TRIPS obligations to protect human rights. Moreover, much like in national 
systems, human rights provisions could be endowed with a superior status, allowing them to prevail 
over traditional WTO law in case of a conflict225. However, the negotiations of the Doha Declaration 
showed that  the political  feasibility  of  the above mentioned initiatives  is  questionable,  as political 
opposition prevents endowing the human rights regime with a stronger enforcement mechanism226. 
Considering the these difficulties, HESTERMEYER concludes that a less ambitious and most likely 
220 OCTAVIANI, ibidem, p. 145.
221 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 300.
222 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 287.
223 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 287.
224 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 68.
225 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 287.
226 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 288.
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route for the importation of human rights law into WTO law is through WTO jurisprudence227. The 
author maintains that it is time for WTO jurisprudence to step in and start using human rights law in the 
interpretation of the WTO Agreements228. 
Another argument is that WTO dispute settlement and WTO members are not entirely free to decide to 
which extent  TRIPS flexibilities  are  going to  be adopted  or  to  which  extent  patent  rules  shall  be 
interpreted in accordance to human rights approach. The CESCR, in its General Comment No. 17, 
expressed its view that parties are obliged to strike an adequate balance whereby the private interests of 
authors  should  not  be  unduly favoured  but  adequately  balanced with  the  interest  of  the  public  in 
enjoying broad access to their productions. The CESCR states that, ultimately, intellectual property is a  
social product and has a social function and parties thus have a duty to prevent unreasonably high costs  
for access to essential medicines229. 
Accordingly, resolutions of the United Nations Human Rights Council230 call upon member states to 
promote  access  to  medicines,  including  through  the  full  use  of  the  TRIPS  Agreement  and  the 
flexibilities it provides. 
In  this  sense,  the  Doha  Declaration  has  served  as  a  catalyst  for  developing  coherence  at  the 
international level. It made public health issues a central focus of work carried out by the WTO on 
intellectual  property  and  international  trade  and  supported  WTO members  to  use,  to  the  full,  the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement for the purpose of promoting access to medicines for all231. 
227 The security  exception of  article  73 of  the  TRIPS Agreement  could provide an entry for  human rights  
concerns. “Relying on a modern, broad definition of security that includes large-scale threats to human  
rights, a WTO panel can invoke the provision to allow Members facing public health crises including India  
and Brazil  to refuse the grant of patents for drugs to treat pandemics altogether. Such a holding would  
ensure  that  generics  to  treat  pandemics  remain  available—even  if  the  medicine  is  still  under  patent  
protection in the developed world”. HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 289.
228 HESTERMEYER pointed out that is well worth remembering that in the European Union human rights were 
imported via the judiciary too. “The treaties of the European Communities did not provide for human rights  
protection. It was the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that began to apply fundamental rights as general  
principles of law, drawing inspiration from member states' constitutions and international treaties on which  
the member states collaborated. WTO panels could follow the example and apply human rights provisions as  
part of general international law, which (...) includes access to medicines”. HESTERMEYER,  ibidem, p. 
288.
229 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 41.
230 Resolution on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health in the context of development and access to medicines: A/HRC/RES/17/14; Resolution on the 
right  of  everyone  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  highest  attainable  standard  of  physical  and  mental  health:  
A/HRC/RES/15/22; Resolution on access to medicine in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of  the  highest  attainable  standard  of  physical  and  mental  health:  A/HRC/RES/12/24;  Reports  of  the 
Secretary-General on access to medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria: A/HRC/7/30, E/CN.4/2006/39, E/CN.4/2005/38, E/CN.4/2003/48. 
231 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 19 and 73.
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5 CONCLUSION
The pharmaceutical sector stands out in terms of its dependence on patents primarily to shoulder high 
costs of testing, developing and approving goods, and because some innovations, as in the case of 
pharmaceuticals, are generally relatively easy to reverse-engineer and thus are open to easy copying in 
the  absence  of  intellectual  property232.  Moreover,  the  protection  and  enforcement  of  intellectual 
property  can  provide  a  more  secure  environment  for  the  transfer  of  technology,  especially  for 
developing countries and also be a useful instrument for obtaining finance (venture)233. 
However,  intellectual  property may also create  barriers  to  the  enjoyment  of  fundamental  rights.  It 
provides a basis for charging higher prices for drugs and for technology transfer, which can restrict 
access234. Besides, it may cause undue restrictions on research.    
Therefore, the question that remains is how to strike the right balance between protecting intellectual 
property rights and promoting public access to knowledge235. Considering this dilemma, the first part of 
this work gave a general overview of how the WTO deals with human rights. Briefly, it was explained 
that the TRIPS agreement was designed under a functional approach and that it did not take a human 
rights approach on its inception, thus giving emphasis to patent law rather then pursue the balance 
between these competing regimes. Moreover, according to WTO jurisprudence, non-WTO treaties and 
general international law can be used merely as an aid for interpreting the covered agreements, as long 
as they do not contradict WTO agreements. They are not part of the applicable law nor can prevail over 
a  WTO covered  agreement.  Because  of  these  findings  and because  access  to  medicine  is  not  un-
doubtedly understood as a jus cogens, a WTO member cannot rely on the right to access to medicine as 
a defence against a claim of violation of WTO law, absent a basis for the defence in the covered agree-
ments236. 
In addition, where human rights law is in conflict with WTO law, states will tend to abide by the rul-
ings of WTO dispute settlement organs due to its effective enforcement mechanism, whereas the hu-
man rights regime has a rather weak enforcement mechanism at the international level. To aggravate 
the situation further, there is a prevailing interference of economic and private interests and internation-
al pressure on WTO members leading to the adoption of measures not required by TRIPS that are in 
opposition to public health concerns. In conclusion, the balance between human rights and patent law is 
in practice impaired. 
The second part engaged in a empirical analysis of two Brazilian case studies: “Pharmaceutical Patents 
on Access to Medicines” and “ONSA Network’s Genoma Program”, in order to demonstrate how the 
Brazilian health system was affect by the TRIPS Agreement and the consequences of it. 
232 HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, para. 37.
233 WHO, WIPO, WTO, ibidem, p. 13.
234 In particular, as added by the UN High Commissioner, the World Bank has noted that intellectual property 
rights  can  sometimes  prevent  the  distribution  of  potential  international  public  goods  helpful  to  poor 
countries, which can seldom afford the prices charged by patent owners. HIGH COMMISSIONER, ibidem, 
para. 42.
235 DUNCAN, ibidem.
236 HESTERMEYER, ibidem, p. 300.
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The case “Pharmaceutical Patents on Access to Medicines in Brazil” illustrates the dilemma of, on the 
one hand,  protecting intellectual property rights, with the adoption, by Brazilian legislators, of early 
implementation, patent pipeline and the prohibition of parallel importation; and, on the other hand, pro-
moting public access, with the adoption of counter-measures to increase the access to medicines and to 
mitigate the effects of TRIPS, namely compulsory licenses, the prior consent mechanism, the Bolar ex-
ception and the Popular Drugstore Program. It was also pointed out examples of interference of eco-
nomic private interests in the arena of intellectual property, leading to measures that go beyond the 
TRIPS Agreement’s minimum standards. 
Another example of a measure aimed at mitigating the effects of the patent system is the second case 
study, namely, the “Brazilian ONSA Network’s Genoma Program”. The ONSA Network is an open 
source model based on a collaborative and open approach to innovation, with the outcome of making 
research available in the public domain. The case denotes that under certain circumstances, for example 
research conducted within public institutions, an alternative model - free from the patent law's restric-
tions .  can be more suitable. Open source initiatives, however,  require a legal construction and the 
agreement (waiver of rights) of all possible patent holders. Considering that in the pharmaceutical sec-
tor there is usually a joint participation of public funding and private companies in order to deliver a  
finished health product, private corporations may not agree to waive their patent rights. Therefore, so 
far, open source models have had only a minor impact on public health. The appropriateness by private 
companies of patents which resulted from public funded research, and other issues such as undue re-
strictions on research, unwillingness to focus on orphan diseases and unprotected traditional know-
ledge, are still waiting for a better solution. 
To sum up, both the first and second part of this work denotes that the balance between human rights 
and patent law is in practice impaired. As so, there are, in the first instance, calls for the international 
trading system to give greater consideration to human rights concerns in order to provide WTO mem-
bers with a more secure basis to, relying on the right to health, adopt measures that may be in detriment  
to patent law.
Some scholars have suggested possible solutions but the practical and political feasibility is a great bar-
rier. As a first step, a less ambitious and most likely route for the importation of human rights law into 
WTO law is through WTO jurisprudence. In this regard, the WTO should step in and start using human 
rights law in the interpretation of its rules in line with the understanding that intellectual property is a 
social product and has a social function and parties thus have a duty to balance the interest of the patent  
holders with the interest of the public in enjoying broad access to their products.
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